Checking in on smartphone and Twitter usage

Over at Rubicon, we just did a quick consumer survey to check the status of a couple of hot topics in the tech industry, smartphone adoption and use of Twitter. I thought you might be interested. Here's a summary of what we found, and links to the full articles:

Smartphone adoption: RIM leads. In the US, about 10%-11% of the adult population uses smartphones. RIM has just under half of the installed base, followed by Apple at about a quarter.

The users of different types of smartphone have different feature priorities. iPhone users rate web browsing as their #1 feature, followed closely by e-mail. RIM users rank e-mail the most important feature, Palm users choose calendar, and Google phone users are partial to mapping. The profile for Windows Mobile users is similar to RIM's, but less enthusiastic about e-mail.


Mobile phone feature priorities of iPhone users compared to all mobile phone users. Percent of US users ranking a feature in their top four.

I think this is more evidence of something that I've been saying for a while -- most people buy phones more like they do appliances than like computers. They decide which functions are most important to them, and then pick the phone that does those things best, rather than looking for the best general-purpose device.

That's not to say that flexibility doesn't matter at all, but it's secondary. For example, adding third party apps is the #4 priority among iPhone users, and close to tied with several other features. It will be interesting to see how the priority evolves as Apple continues to advertise the daylights out of the app store.

For the full article, click here.

Twitter is a form of entertainment. Usage of Twitter is rising very rapidly -- as of April, it gets more daily visitors than cnn.com in the US, according to Alexa.com.

Our survey showed that the Twitter user base has more than doubled in the last six months. About 10% of US computer users have tried Twitter so far, and about a third of those people have stopped using it. You can decide for yourself if that's a big number or not, but a certain amount of churn is inevitable in any new web service.


Twitter awareness and usage among US PC users.

Most Twitter users say they are casual users of the service, and that it doesn't play an important part of their personal or business lives. The most active 10% of Twitter users say it does play an important role in their personal lives, but not in their business lives.

The overall pattern of usage indicates that for most people Twitter is currently a form of casual entertainment. There's nothing wrong with that, but the future of Twitter will depend on how that usage pattern evolves. Will Twitter become as important as e-mail, or will it be a fad like citizens' band radio (link)? It's too early to tell. But it's already clear that it's a separate medium with its own rules. Companies looking to use Twitter should make sure they understand how it's used; it's not the same as blogging.

For the full article, click here.

I'm reading: Checking in on smartphone and Twitter usage

Watch out for RIM

Based on what you read in the press, you'd think Apple had conquered the entire smartphone market, or maybe that they invented it in the first place. But to me the most surprising story in recent smartphone sales isn't Apple, it's the continuing rapid growth of Research in Motion.

Check out the latest numbers from Gartner (link). As you know if you've been reading this weblog for a while, I have very little faith in third party market share numbers. They're compiled from shipments self-reported by the vendors, and are subject to all sorts of inaccuracies (link). But they do give a very rough picture of what's happening in the market, and the picture they've been drawing recently is mildly astonishing.

Nokia is still the smartphone share leader, with about 41% unit share. But that's down 10 points from a year ago, on a shipment decrease of about 17% year over year. RIM is number two, with over 19% share and shipments up about 85% year over year. Apple is in third: 11% share, up 110% year over year.

So, roughly speaking, in smartphones Nokia is about twice the size of RIM, and RIM is about twice the size of Apple.

I have to put a caveat on that. Quarterly share and shipment growth fluctuates a lot depending on whether a company has just introduced a new product or is clearing inventory in preparation for a launch. So you have to look at several quarters:


Unit smartphone shipments, worldwide, in thousands. Source: Gartner.

That gives a slightly less apocalyptic view for Nokia. It had particularly huge shipments in Q4 of 2007, so it's down year over year, but overall its shipments are flat rather than collapsing. RIM and Apple are both definitely growing fast, though, with Apple's shipments fluctuating a lot as it adjusted inventory before and after the shipment of the iPhone 3G.

But let's put this all in perspective. The definition of "smartphone" is very sketchy; the way Gartner uses the term today, it refers to basically any phone that has an externally-programmable OS in it. Nokia deploys the Symbian OS in all of its high-end phones, so they are all classified as smartphones. So RIM's not really beating up on Nokia's smartphones, it is currently out-growing the entire top end of Nokia's product line. Project out the current trends for a year, and RIM would be close to overtaking Nokia in smartphones. No matter how you parse the numbers, that's pretty amazing.


Why don't you just die already?

This situation is all the more surprising considering that conventional wisdom has said for years that RIM was doomed. First e-mail phones were just a fad, an extension of the pager market. Then they were just a vertical product that only a few specialized groups like stock brokers would care about. Then Microsoft was on the verge of destroying RIM (not once, but every time a new version of Windows Mobile came out). Then RIM was fated to fall into irrelevance unless it licensed Blackberry clones. And on and on...

Fortunately, RIM completely ignored conventional wisdom and stuck to its core business. The rewards have been immense. In its most recent quarterly report (in December), RIM had a revenue run rate of about $12 billion a year, up more than 60% year over year, and profit of about $1 billion a year. The company now employs about 12,000 people. For comparison, RIM's revenue is now about the same as Apple's was four years ago.

Companies with $12 billion in revenue aren't supposed to grow 60% a year, especially when the economy is gasping, so I'll be intensely interested to see RIM's next quarterly report on April 2. In this economic climate I won't take anything for granted. But keep in mind that Nokia is already making ominous noises about its sales (link), while RIM says its unit growth has been accelerating (link).


Face reality

I think the big message from these numbers is that the analysts and press have done a terrible disservice to all of us by creating the fiction that there is a unified smartphone market. That hides the real news. For example, IDG's writeup on the Gartner sales report focused on overall growth of smartphone sales and didn't even mention RIM until the sixth paragraph (link).

I use the term smartphone "market" here for convenience, but as I've said before, there really isn't a single unified smartphone market and there probably never will be, because different people want different things from their phones (link).

If you look carefully at the shipment numbers, this is blindingly obvious. The smartphones from RIM (and Apple) are differentiated products that have special features appealing to particular segments of users (RIM for e-mail fanatics, Apple for entertainment-hounds). They solve customer problems in unique ways that people can value, so their sales are relatively resistant to an economic downturn. Not immune, but I think they're likely to fall less than the others.

And since Apple and RIM serve different markets, they can grow rapidly side by side. One doesn't usually steal sales from the other.

But Nokia has never had a strong play with this sort of product. Most of its smartphones are bought as high-end mobile phones, purchased by technophiles and status-conscious people with money. When the overall phone market slows down, they slow down too.

The analyst numbers told Nokia a comforting fantasy that it was the dominant smartphone company, when in fact it was a very secondary player in the markets served by RIM and Apple. I think this let Nokia avoid the agonizing changes in product development that are required to make a truly differentiated smart phone.

Instead, Nokia has gone off on tangents attacking Google, Microsoft, iTunes, and just about every other target I can think of in computing. It's a bit like a guy at his home putting up wallpaper in the upstairs bathroom while out in the yard his car is on fire.

I continue to be intrigued by parts of Nokia's strategy, especially the Ovi services suite. Nokia will be able to push Ovi out to hundreds of millions of mobile phone users. In theory, that might be a very powerful way for the company to build a mobile data business. But it could be crippled if the most data-hungry users have already been siphoned away by Apple and RIM.


What happens to RIM?

The question about RIM is what are the natural limits on its growth. Not everyone wants an e-mail phone, although RIM has already stretched the market a lot more than I thought they could. But I think the bigger threat may actually be within the company. Beyond about $10 billion in revenue, a tech company starts to require different management techniques. There's enough going on that management has to delegate much more than it did in the past, and processes have to be set up to ensure quality work and smart decision-making in the lower reaches of the company. That transition is incredibly hard for the leaders of a startup to make, and I wonder if the bug-filled launch of the Blackberry Storm wasn't a symptom of a company growing beyond its processes.

On the other hand, RIM has such a long history of beating my expectations that I'm not going to bet against them again.

I'm reading: Watch out for RIM

Does anybody really know what smartphone market share is?

An article in Wired online this week had a chart showing US smartphone market share (link). The chart gave more detail than I've seen recently from other research companies, so I thought it was worth reproducing the data here:



The source is Nielsen Mobile, formerly Telephia. The interesting thing about them is that they do much of the service quality monitoring for the operators, so they have much more direct access to mobile usage information than folks like IDC and Canalys, the people usually quoted for smartphone share.

Wired was focused on Palm's loss of market share, which is indeed striking (but not exactly news). But take a look at the chart again; there are a couple of other items that I think are more newsworthy.

The first surprise is that Nielsen shows Apple in fourth place in smartphone share. That's wildly different from what Canalys, the source usually reported, has been saying (link). Here's how they compare for Q4 2007:




What in the world is going on here?

I'm not sure, but I have some guesses. Canalys doesn't directly measure market share, it receives self-reported shipment reports from the manufacturers and then adds them up. That means Canalys measures shipments into the channel rather than sales, and it depends on the hardware companies to be honest.

Riiiight.

Nielsen Mobile doesn't explain on its website exactly how it measures share, but apparently it's using a mix of survey results and the usage data it gathers from the operators (link). So its numbers should reflect current usage of phones rather than shipments. If Nielsen is measuring installed base share, rather than share of current sales, that might explain the difference. Although in that case, share should not be changing as fast as Nielsen shows. So I'm still confused.

If anybody can shed more light on the source of the difference, please post a comment. I've also asked Nielsen, and will let you know if I hear anything.

The conflict in the numbers underlines how ridiculously useless the publicly-available third party sales numbers are in the mobile phone market, and how little attention the press is paying to the inconsistencies. Apple's share varies from 8% to 28%, and no one even notices. Hey, we got a pretty chart and it confirms what we wanted to say, so don't ask questions.

If you want more information on the problems with mobile market share tracking, I wrote a detailed post here (link).

I said there were two newsworthy things about the Nielsen numbers. Can you spot the second one?

That's right, since the iPhone was released, RIM has been gaining share. So much for the folks who predicted at the launch of the iPhone that it was going to take the smartphone market away from RIM. Instead, at least in the first round of competition, we see what you'd expect from a segmented market -- RIM appeals to some customers, Apple appeals to a different group, and both companies do well.

I can't wait to see what the numbers will look like in six months, after the iPhone 3G has been out for a while. Although probably Canalys and Nielsen will still disagree wildly on what's happening.

I'm reading: Does anybody really know what smartphone market share is?

Only 10% of Japanese people know how to use all the functions in their mobile phones

A Japanese survey of mobile phone users, translated by What Japan Thinks, reports that only about 10% of Japanese mobile phone users say they have mastery (or a good command) over all the functions of their mobile phones (link). About 75% of users say they have mastered less than half of the functions in the phone.

The most confusing functions were e-wallet, applications in general, music player, and Internet access.

What Japan Thinks concludes that few people in Japan "are really comfortable with their phones," which I find reassuring because it says that people in Japan aren't all that different from everyone else on the planet. In many countries there's a tendency to believe that people in Japan (and Korea) use mobile devices so differently from everyone else that there's nothing useful to learn from them. It's as if they're on a different planet. But the reality is that even in Japan, a phone overloaded with features and cryptic menus is confusing to anyone except the most dedicated technophiles.

It is interesting that so many mobile phones in Japan have e-wallet, applications, music, and Internet built in. That's a result of the aggressive rollout of integrated phones and online services by Japanese mobile phone operators -- the real driver that I think makes the Japanese mobile market so different.

(By the way, in case anyone's interested, another survey determined that 14 percent of Japanese cats won't go to the bathroom if someone's watching [link]. Who knew?)

I'm reading: Only 10% of Japanese people know how to use all the functions in their mobile phones

Nokia goes for 1% market share in the US

Okay, I'll admit in advance that this is going to be a pretty snarky post, but it never ceases to amaze me how badly Nokia handles itself in the US market. In Europe and most of the rest of the world, Nokia operates like a fighter jet, incredibly nimble and powerful. But in the US, it's more like a biplane. An old biplane. With holes in the wings. Nokia's market share in the US has dropped from 20% to 7% in the last two years (link), and sometimes I wonder if it's trying for 1%.

Case in point: Nokia's "Open to Anything" ad campaign featuring people who have created software for Nokia N95 smartphones (link).

It features, swear to God, a guy who created a self-hypnosis application for the N95, someone who created a bad breath detector, a man in the Witness Protection Program who created a location-aware app to track the hit men chasing him, a ditzy woman who uses the phone to track fertilizer schedules for her plants, a jealous wife who created a lie detector, and a flake Jewish photographer who glued together two n95s to create a 3D camera.

"You've never really seen a bris until you've seen a bris in 3D." --Nokia's website

They're all fantasy applications from obviously fake people, but beautifully animated in an elaborate Flash-driven site.

From time to time, I've talked with Nokia employees who were confused about why people don't buy more application software for their Nokia S60 smartphones. There are a lot of reasons -- lack of awareness that they can do it, lack of a built-in software store on the device, incompatibility between various versions of S60, etc. But one huge reason is because no one has ever made a compelling case to most users on why they should care about smartphone software.


The triumph of creativity over business sense

The Open to Anything campaign is a great example of how Nokia's hurting itself in the applications business, and in the US market in general. I'm sure Nokia's intent was to do something light-hearted to draw attention to the N95, and if you view the ads as standalone short films they are moderately witty. You see this a lot in online marketing lately -- a creative agency will create humorous websites (often with video) designed to draw traffic from bored web surfers. But unless the ads also align with your strategy, they don't drive sales. In Nokia's case, they actually do harm:

--Once again, Nokia is communicating that its users are freaks and morons, which in the US is not the way to build a loyal following. Nokia has a long habit in the US of positioning itself as the preferred phone of people who lack social skills. At least this time there aren't any sluts in the ad (link).

--The benefit of an open phone is not that you can write your own apps, it's that you can buy applications created by others. Almost no one wants to create their own apps. So we're being told that N95 users are not only freaks and morons, but they are freaks and morons who have programming skills -- an even narrower demographic.

--Since the argument for why users should care about applications has not been made, showing a bunch of nonsensical applications actually makes people less likely to take an interest in mobile apps at all. It trivializes the whole idea of mobile software, at a time when Nokia claims it is trying to make itself into a computing company that can compete with Apple and Google.

Meanwhile, Apple's ads depict its users as smart and hip, it puts its CEO on stage with real developers showing lustworthy iPhone applications, and it plans a built-in software store for the iPhone. Care to guess which platform is going to get more user and developer loyalty?

I'm tempted to start taking bets on when the iPhone application base will be larger than S60's. Unless Nokia wises up quickly, it won't take long.

I'm reading: Nokia goes for 1% market share in the US

Nokia, the computer company?

Ten years from now, Nokia's going to be the subject of an interesting business case study. It'll either be the stirring story of a company at the height of its power that had the courage to challenge its deepest beliefs. Or it'll be the cautionary tale of a company that had it all and blew it.

Nokia says it's planning for what comes after the mobile phone.

I've heard this from Nokia before, but I always used to think it was posturing. Companies say that sort of thing all the time -- "we're looking for the next big growth driver" or something like that, meaning they plan to keep doing all the same stuff they do today but also desperately hope they can grow another line of business alongside it. That's typical in business; you try to have your cake and eat it too.

But after hearing several senior Nokia people repeat the message over the last couple of months, I've started to believe they're saying something different. Don't get me wrong, I'm not trying to say they are about to abandon mobile phones. But I think they sincerely believe that business won't last forever, and they're starting to lay the groundwork for what will replace it.

The message really hit home last month, when I heard it from Nokia CTO Tero Ojanpera and Bob Iannucci, head of Nokia Research Center, at a Nokia strategy briefing in Silicon Valley. Iannucci pointed out that Nokia started as a paper mill and has a history of completely changing its industry from time to time -- from rubber boots to monitors to mobile phones. He said it is once again "a company in transition to the next phase." That next phase is mobile computing.

Not smartphones, not converged devices, but full-on mobile computers intended to replace both PCs and mobile phones. Nokia says it expects these devices to eventually sell in the billions of units, and to become the world's dominant means of accessing the Internet.

Even though these future devices will still be mobile, if you take all of Nokia's statements at face value the changes from mobile phones will be so extensive that it's fair to call it a new business.

The fact that Nokia's even talking about this is a remarkable change. Five years ago, Microsoft was charging hard in mobile and the big topic of discussion was how could a company like Nokia possibly defend itself. Now Nokia's talking about how it will put the PC industry out to pasture, and oh by the way take over the Internet as well.

Although the goal is almost insanely ambitious, I can't say that Nokia is wrong to try. Mobile phones are gradually becoming a commodity. The biggest unit growth is in low-end phones, a strength for Nokia because of its volumes and efficiencies. But even Nokia managers will tell you that creating low-end products in a saturating market is not a fun business. It certainly won't produce the sort of growth and margins that investors expect.

Nokia's not predicting the instant death of the mobile phone business. It's a very large and divisionalized company, and I'm sure big chunks of Nokia are hell-bent on staying a mobile phone company forever. But it sounds like the senior management feels the mobile phone business is becoming uninteresting, and they want to get started on the next thing before the current business rides off into a long Nordic sunset.


The hard part is implementing

Becoming a mobile computing company is a lot harder than talking about it. The mobile phone world is based on managed competition, in which operators, handset vendors, and governments create shared standards even as they compete. It's a closed circle in which new features flow down from the top like molasses running down a cake of ice, driven by fiat from the leading vendors.

The computing world is much more Darwinian. Barriers to entry are lower, and innovation often flows up from the smallest players. Companies compete in something that resembles a free-for-all, with the marketplace choosing winners.

So what Nokia's talking about is not just a change in product design. It's more like a wholesale remaking of the company's culture, processes, and partnerships. The advantage of this for Nokia is that if it successfully makes the transition, it will have put everyone else in the mobile phone industry -- handset vendors and operators -- at a permanent disadvantage, unless they can make the same wrenching transition.

The disadvantage is that the change is pretty darned wrenching for Nokia as well.

Nokia seems to understand at least some of the changes it has to make in order to be a computing company. Iannucci acknowledged that the "Internet model" of product development is to create and ship products first, and then bother about standards later (if at all).

He said Nokia's research labs, formerly fairly closed, have re-oriented themselves to work collaboratively with universities and other parties in the industry. The collaboration part is essential because "we can no longer fuel...internally" the amount of technology the company has to develop now that it wants to be a computing company.

Thus the briefing in California -- they want to be a part of the peculiar hive mind we call Silicon Valley.


The transition will be awkward

One amusing example was when a Nokia speaker solicited feedback from the audience on what barriers to success they see in the mobile marketplace.

A VC shot up his hand: "Operators."

Dead silence for a second. Then the Nokia speaker asked uncomfortably, "what in particular about operators?"

And you had to laugh a bit, because the question didn't really need to be explained. What the questioner meant was: "we want the operators dead; are you going to help make that happen?" Everyone in the room knew that. Nokia knew that. The question was a test of Nokia's seriousness.

Nokia didn't exactly pass the test. They won't answer that question on stage because it creates too many political issues for the current mobile phone business. So what could have been a nice bonding moment between Nokia and the Silicon Valley folks degenerated into a carefully nuanced spiel about "we're working together to address many issues" and bland verbiage like that. They ended the Q&A soon after.

Lesson: If you want to bond with somebody, be prepared to discuss the issues they care about. And don't ask for feedback unless you're prepared to answer tough questions.


Next steps

Here are some other issues that I think Nokia will need to work through if it really wants to bond with Silicon Valley.

Get real about the role of mobile computing. As far as I can tell, Nokia's hoping that the mobile computer will literally replace PCs. I think that's both naive and unnecessarily limiting to Nokia's prospects. Mobile usage is a different paradigm from personal computing. You use a PC in a long sessions at a static location; you use a mobile while on the go, in places where a PC isn't convenient. That different usage pattern means the users are likely to have different requirements and different expectations for mobiles than they have for PCs. If Nokia tries to just make mini-PCs, it's probably going to end up with products that don't deliver on the great new stuff that mobile computing can really do.

To give a rough analogy, if the mobile phone companies had focused only on making land lines mobile, would they have ever invented SMS?

Nurture developer communities. Nokia has a very extensive developer support organization, but I'm not yet seeing the sort of broad-scale evangelism -- developer recruitment -- that an Apple or Microsoft practices. To really win over the best developers, it's not enough to just make their development tasks easy, you have to make sure they have the opportunity to make money. No one's doing that well in the mobile space today. Including Nokia.

The mobile software companies continue to flail around trying to figure out which company can build a business opportunity worth committing to. The opportunity is there for Nokia, but it has to invest in building the market.

Manage Adobe vs. Microsoft vs. Sun. Nokia said it's working very closely with Adobe on Apollo, the new software operating layer derived from Flash and Acrobat. The implication is that Nokia will distribute the mobile version of Apollo on its phones, just as it distributes Flash today.

There are two potential downsides to this. The first is that Adobe might lose -- it's facing strong competition from Microsoft's Silverlight, and apparently from a revamped version of mobile Java from Sun (I'm planning to write about that one in the future). If one of the others wins, Nokia might end up deeply committed to a failing standard.

The second danger is that Adobe might win, leaving Nokia at the mercy of a mobile software standard controlled by a different company. Replacing the Microsoft monopoly with an Adobe monopoly would be delightful for Adobe, but it isn't going to feel like much of a win for Nokia.

Learn to design solutions, not gadgets. I think this is Nokia's biggest challenge. The most popular mobile computing products so far have been integrated hardware-software systems aimed at a single usage: GameBoy, iPod, BlackBerry, and of course the mobile phone itself. Nokia hasn't been notably good at designing this sort of integrated system. In fact, its most prominent effort so far, the nGage, was an epic failure on the scale of the Edsel and the presidential campaign of Michael Dukakis.

But if Nokia really wants to be a mobile computing company, this is a skill it absolutely must learn. It is an incredibly hard change for Nokia, because computing systems design requires a very strong culture of product managers who understand the customer and have dictatorial control over the features and interface of the product. A good computing system is a product of idiosyncratic vision. Collectivist Nokia, with its endless conversations and responsibility fragmented across dozens of teams, is in a terrible situation to pull this off. Frankly, I'm skeptical that they can do it.

But on the other hand, if they can turn a pulp mill into a mobile phone company, would you really bet against them?

I'm reading: Nokia, the computer company?

The shape of the smartphone and mobile data markets

With all the new mobile devices coming out, I thought it would be useful to give an overview of the market for mobile data. I covered some of this information in a post written about a year ago, but this one has a lot of new information, plus diagrams.

I believe the market for mobile data devices (smartphones, PDAs, mobile game machines, iPods, etc) is not structured the way most people think it is. A lot of new mobile products fail because they're not designed for the real market, or because they target imagined customers who don't really exist in large numbers.

There are two big erroneous assumptions that I think many people make about mobile data:


First incorrect assumption: Mobile data is for everyone. Most people assume that mobile data devices like smartphones will eventually be used by everyone. The idea is that they're being bought by early adopters now, but as prices drop they'll soon be adopted by the whole population. The market is supposed to look like this:



Higher prices are to the right. Smartphone sales start with the early adopters at the right, and then as prices drop everyone switches to smartphones and starts using all their features.

The only problem with this idea is that there's no evidence to indicate that it's true, at least not in the US and Europe (where I've done research). In fact, almost all of the evidence I've seen to date shows that the market is deeply divided into two groups. When surveyed, most people in the US and Europe say they will not pay anything extra for mobile device features other than voice and SMS. They'll use those features if you give them away for free, but as soon as you ask them to pay, about 65% of the population drops out. This makes them very unpromising targets for device companies that want to sell value-added devices, operators who want to sell advanced services, and software companies that want to sell mobile data apps.

Fortunately, the other 35% of the US and European population is willing to pay extra for mobile data features.

So the real market looks like this:



The people I labeled "value-added users" are the mobile data market. But that's only the beginning...


Second incorrect assumption: There is one smartphone market. Most people assume that there's just one market for smartphones, and that eventually we'll see the emergence of a single ultimate smartphone that everyone uses. I can't tell you how many times I got that question from press people and analysts when I worked at Palm: "Which is the device that everyone's going to use?"

The answer is, that device doesn't exist, because the people who are willing to pay extra for mobile data features don't all want the same features. They want conflicting things, and are very unwilling to pay extra for the features they don't want. The ideal hobile device for me might be completely repulsive to you, and vice-versa.

This misconception has fueled an uncounted number of online debates in which people argue why the device they like ought to be adopted by everyone. What they're really arguing is that everyone else should think and feel like them, which is why these online debates never reach a conclusion.

Rather than looking for the mobile market to "converge" the way that most PCs converged to Windows, I think we should expect mobile devices to diverge into different segments. The right analogy for the mobile market isn't PCs, it's cars. As the car market grew in the 1900s, it stratified into trucks and minivans and SUVs and sports cars and so on.

The same divergence is already underway in mobile data.


There are at least three segments in mobile data

If mobile data isn't for everyone on the planet, and if the market is divided into segments, the most important question to ask is what those segments are. What are the equivalent of the sports car, SUV, and minivan for mobile?

We researched that extensively at PalmSource, in a series of surveys that eventually talked to more than 12,000 people in the US, France, Germany, and the UK. In that research, we found at least three big groups of mobile data customers, each with different needs and tastes: people who focus on communication (e-mail, messaging, conferencing), people who focus on entertainment (games, video, music), and people who focus on managing information (databases, documents, note-taking). Each was about 12% of the population.

The results were very consistent across countries, so I'm comfortable that the same segments probably exist in most European countries. The only significant difference was Germany, where the percent of the population who said they were willing to pay for entertainment features was smaller. I don't know if that's a real difference in usage, or if folks in Germany are just less willing to admit that they might use a computing device to play games.

The results probably can't be projected to other places like Japan and China; somebody else needs to do that research (or I'll do it if you want to fund it ;-) .

Here's a little detail on each of the three mobile data segments:

The entertainment-focused users are generally younger than average; many are in college or their 20s. They see a mobile device as a lifestyle choice, and they're willing to pay extra for a device that'll help keep them entertained. Different people want different forms of entertainment, so there are sub-segments in the entertainment mobile market. The biggest division is game-playing vs. media (music and video). But entertainment can also include things like social messaging with your friends. It's anything you do for fun rather than a paycheck.

The communication-focused users are extroverts who live to communicate with others. They're often in people-facing jobs like sales. They're willing to pay extra for a mobile device that lets them keep up with others in multiple ways. E-mail, SMS, voice, conferencing, video calling -- basically, anything communication-related is compelling to them, and they will pay extra for a device that does it well.

The information-centric users are more introverted. Rather than focusing on their dialog with others, they tend to do a lot of thinking on their own, and want their mobile device to be a memory supplement and a means to capture new information. They're not by any means recluses, but ideas rather than social interaction are what really gets them energized, and so they're willing to pay extra for features that help them capture and remember ideas and information. What they really want is a brain extender. They often work in information-heavy jobs like medicine, law, science, and academia.

Of course, there's always some overlap between markets -- for instance, you might have a doctor who also wants to stay entertained when off work. So if you draw the three mobile data markets, they overlap a bit, like one of those Venn diagrams you drew in primary school:





Understanding the products

Now that we've mapped the customer landscape, we can start plotting various products on the chart. This is where we'll start to get some interesting insights. But first, we have to add one technology overlay: in the mobile world, some mobile devices have phones built in and some don't. So add a gray circle in the center:




Now let's chart some products.


The communicators:



This is the most crowded market (in fact, I left off a number of products because I ran out of space on the chart). Although there used to be communicators without phones built in (RIM's early products were an example), putting all communication in one place is a huge benefit to a communication-centric user, so merging the phone and communicator was an obvious move in this market.

I classify the Danger Hiptop as a borderline product between the entertainment and communication markets because it's focused on social communication for young people. Sony Mylo is another borderline product, this one without a phone.

The Palm Treo, SonyEricsson p900 line, and touchscreen Windows Mobile products are on the border between communication and information management. They all have touch screens and a lot of information management features, but also attempt to deliver robust e-mail. At this point, they are being outsold by the much more communication-specialized RIM Blackberry line.


In the entertainer market, you can see the strong role of sub-segments. The game-player market has been dominated by Nintendo's GameBoy, with the recent addition of Sony's PSP. The media market is ruled by the Apple iPod.



The iPhone is an attempt to create a phone + media entertainment device. It'll be interesting to see how the iPhone does in the market -- it was an obvious move to combine a communicator with a phone, but it's not as obvious that the entertainer is a natural match with a phone. The danger to Apple will be if users see iPhone as the worst of both worlds: a phone that lacks a good keypad and an iPod with very small memory.


Information managers are an underserved market. Early PDAs targeted these users, but the device features were too limited to build a lasting franchise. The main champions of the PDA market, Palm and Microsoft, have now both focused most of their effort toward communicators. As a result, information manager innovation has basically ground to a halt, and the users in this space are very frustrated.




What it means: Opportunities and dangers

Some types of convergence are better than others. Combining phone technology with a mobile data device can be very successful when you stay within a single usage market. You tailor both the phone features and the data features to the needs of that particular type of customer. But trying to converge two markets is an extremely risky idea, something mobile companies should avoid. The needs of the markets conflict, so there is an extremely high risk that you'll end up being cannibalized on either side by products designed specifically for the needs of single markets.

The communicator market is over-crowded and therefore risky. When you realize that the communicator market is only about 12% of the population, there are probably more communicator products shipping now than the market can support. Communicators are likely to face price pressure, and some of the products will probably sink like a stone. The RIM and Palm OS products are probably a little safer here because they have more unique features and loyal customer bases, and Nokia may do okay if it can add some differentiation. But Windows Mobile communicators are likely to be a happy market only for mobile companies that can live on commodity margins.

This is not a place where I'd be looking to build new devices, but many companies are introducing new communicators because they'd rather pursue an established market than build a new one.

The iPhone is not a Blackberry killer. One of the things I like about this chart is that it shows immediately why the iPhone is not a major threat to Blackberry sales. They're in very different markets. If RIM is hoping to move into the entertainment market with devices like the Pearl, iPhone definitely interferes with that. But the immediate impact of the iPhone is on the products closest to it, meaning Microsoft Zune and the SonyEricsson music phones.

If you don't fit in one of the segments, it's very hard to sell. One of the messages of the market segmentation is that people will pay extra for great solutions to the needs they have in a particular segment. If your product doesn't solve any of those problems, there's not a market for it. Many failures in the mobile data market have been products that focused on features rather than solving specific problems. They may be beloved by technophiles, but there aren't enough of those people to drive a lot of sales. See Nokia's 770 Internet tablet for a good example.

The biggest opportunity is in information management. This market is about the same size as the communicator market, but no major player is investing in it today. This segment is out of favor because of the decline in PDA sales, but remember that people thought the MP3 market was a backwater until Apple introduced the iPod. I can tell you from personal conversations, and the market research, that there's a substantial market here, and the people in it are very frustrated. I think the ideal product for this market would be a minitablet note-taker, which I refer to as an "info pad." You can read more about it here.


What about the middle of the chart?

The other segment we haven't discussed is the center of the chart, the place where information management, communication, and entertainment all come together. Some people like to think of this as the home of the ultimate converged device, and every now and then you'll see a hardware company try to tackle it.

They all fail.

In reality, the center of the chart is a market dead zone. To use the car analogy, designing a mobile data device for all three markets simultaneously is like trying to build a sports car that doubles as a minivan and a tractor. The result is not pretty, and won't be bought by anyone except gadget enthusiasts like me. Unfortunately, there aren't enough of us to make a significant market.



That's my view of the mobile data market. I'm sure other people have different perspectives; please post a comment and share yours.

I'm reading: The shape of the smartphone and mobile data markets